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Abstract
The microcredit market, where inexperienced micro-borrowers meet experienced microﬁnance
institutions (MFIs), is subject to reversed asymmetric information. Thus, MFIs' choices can
shape borrowers' beliefs and their behavior. We analyze how this mechanism may inﬂuence
microﬁnance institution decisions to allocate business training. By means of a theoretical model,
we show that superior information can lead the MFI not to train (or to train less) riskier
borrowers. We then investigate whether this mechanism is empirically relevant, using data
from a French MFI. Conﬁrming our theoretical reasoning, we ﬁnd a non-monotonic relationship
between the MFI's decision to train and the risk that micro-borrowers represent.
Keywords: microcredit, reversed asymmetric information, looking-glass self, bivariate probit, scor-
ing model
JEL Codes: C34, C41, D82, G21
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1 Introduction
Microcredit is a small-scale ﬁnancial tool designed for individuals who are rejected by the con-
ventional ﬁnancial market. Micro-borrowers are often unemployed, lack collateral and have no
experience starting a business. After having been widely used and studied in developing countries,
microcredit is now widespread in developed countries. While its main objective  poverty alleviation
 applies to both types of economies, its implementation involves several particular features in the
developed countries. For example, individual lending is prevalent2 and loans do not speciﬁcally tar-
get women in the industrialized economies. Another important characteristic of microﬁnance in the
developed countries is its use of formal business training including Business Development Services.
European Microﬁnance Institutions have been involved in business training since their emergence.3
Business training refers to various additional non-ﬁnancial support services that accompany loans.
They may consist of deﬁning and developing the business project (assessing proﬁtability, deﬁning a
business strategy and ﬁnancing needs, administrative help), information and help with obtaining ﬁ-
nancing, courses in accounting, management, marketing and law, and the monitoring of the project.
Here, using a theoretical model and empirical evidence (data from a French MFI), we investigate
how an MFI assigns borrowers to training programs.
Preliminary descriptive statistics suggest that individuals assigned to training are not riskier ex-post
than individuals without training: the default rate for borrowers receiving business training is 19%
against 25% for the others. This evidence reﬂects two possible scenarios: either training is targeted
toward (ex-ante) high-risk individuals and is highly eﬃcient (as ex-post borrowers with training are
not riskier than borrowers without training) or training is not targeted exclusively toward high-risk
borrowers and is not highly eﬃcient. The literature is agnostic about the eﬃciency of training in
2Group lending is a well-known lending methodology in microﬁnance which is particularly successful in rural
environments with tightly-knit networks (Postelnicu et al. 2014). Nevertheless, in developing countries an increasing
number of MFIs have begun to implement individual lending (Armendariz and Morduch 2010).
3see Lammermann et al. (2007)
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microﬁnance.4 Studies in both developed and developing economies fail to corroborate the ﬁrst
scenario, where business training is mainly targeted toward the riskiest individuals and is highly
eﬃcient. This lends credence to the second scenario, where business training is not necessarily allo-
cated to the riskiest borrowers. The rationale behind assignment to training is therefore somewhat
puzzling, and the aim of this paper is to explore whether the MFI's superior information may explain
this puzzle. Generally, MFIs ﬁnance ﬁrst-time micro-entrepreneurs who need ﬁnancial backing to
start a business, and who usually lack the necessary experience. It is therefore plausible that the
microﬁnance institutions are better informed than the micro-entrepreneurs about the potential of
the project, for example due to their past experience. In this case, the contract oﬀered by the MFI
(assignment to a training program or not) can reveal information to the borrower about himself,
and thus impact his actions. This mechanism, termed looking-glass self (Cooley 1902), provides a
rationale for the hypothesis where the MFI, having superior information, might indeed not exclu-
sively allocate business training to high risk individuals.
To explore this further, we build a theoretical model in which an MFI has superior information
about the risk of borrowers (i.e. the intrinsic probability that their project will fail). Its choice
on training impacts borrowers' beliefs and shapes their behavior. In this context, we reveal the
existence of equilibria where assignment to business training is not a monotonic function with re-
spect to borrowers' risk. We provide a theoretical model where both the MFI - through business
training - and the borrower - through eﬀort - can impact the probability of success of the project.
In cases where, under symmetric information, the level of training chosen by the MFI is increasing
with a borrower's risk, we show that reversed asymmetric information can lead to a non-monotonic
relationship between business training and the risk of the borrower's project. In particular, we show
that there exists a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium where the optimal level of business training is a
4See for example Karlan and Valdivia (2011) or Lensink et al. (2011) for developing countries; and Balkenhol
et al. (2013), Evans (2011) or Edgcomb (2002) for developed countries
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non-monotonic concave function of risk: at ﬁrst the optimal level of business training is increasing
with the risk of the borrower, and then beyond a certain threshold, it is decreasing.
Our empirical ﬁndings corroborate the existence of such a non-monotonic relationship. We develop
a credit scoring model using a bivariate probit model where we control for individual unobserved
heterogeneity. We ﬁrst estimate borrowers' intrinsic risk by means of a probit regression. Then,
using the simplest form of non-linearity, by introducing the estimated risk and its square term in
the business training probit regression, we ﬁnd that, at ﬁrst, the probability of being assigned to
a business training is increasing with borrowers' risk, and then beyond a certain threshold, it is
decreasing. This result is, moreover, robust to controlling for selection bias (Heckman 1979; Boyes
et al. 1989) and to the use of the inverse of the survival time of the loan, instead of the probability
of default, as an alternative measure of borrowers' risk (Roszbach 2004).
Our analysis contributes to three strands of the literature: the theoretical eﬀect of reversed asym-
metric information, the role of training programs in microﬁnance and the empirics of scoring models.
The looking-glass self eﬀect occurs when the social environment attempts to manipulate self-
perception. This phenomenon has been widely studied in the sociological literature. The term
"looking-glass self" was ﬁrst introduced by Cooley (1902), who argued that people obtain a sense
of who they are by observing how others perceive or treat them. In economics, this concept was
ﬁrst introduced by Benabou and Tirole (2003a) and Benabou and Tirole (2003b). Benabou and
Tirole (2003b) state that for the looking-glass self eﬀect to impact the agent's behavior, the prin-
cipal must have private information relevant to the agent's behavior and the agent must be aware
of the principal's superior information and objectives. Benabou and Tirole (2003a) study various
situations where the principal might be better informed than the agent (for example at school, in
the labor market and in the family) and also consider the case of an informed principal choosing
4
a level of help to provide to the agent.5 In their model, however, the agent has to choose whether
to undertake the task or not conditional on a private signal and on the level of help chosen by
the principal. In contrast, in this paper we consider that the agent chooses a level of eﬀort that
positively impacts the probability of success of the project.
The notion of informed principal was introduced by Myerson (1983) and Maskin and Tirole (1990).
However, it is only relevant in speciﬁc contexts. Ishida (2006) uses a model with an informed prin-
cipal to show that promotions in the labor market can be used strategically in the presence of the
looking-glass self eﬀect. Villeneuve (2000) studies pooling and separating equilibria in a context
where the insurer evaluates risk better than its customers. Swank and Visser (2007) show how
delegation and increased attention from an informed employer can improve the motivation of an
uninformed employee. Nevertheless, these authors point out that their model only ﬁts situations
where the agent is at the beginning of his career or is performing tasks for the ﬁrst time in his life,
whereas the principal has previous experience with similar tasks or agents. This is remarkably like
the microcredit market situation, where micro-entrepreneurs borrow from an experienced MFI to
start a business for the ﬁrst time. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the ﬁrst to introduce
the notion of informed principal to the credit market.
To conﬁrm the plausibility of the non-monotonic relationship between training assignment and bor-
rowers' risk highlighted in our theoretical model, our empirical strategy is based on a bivariate
probit model. We jointly model two probit equations. The ﬁrst equation estimates the training
assignment process. The second equation estimates the probability of default by the borrower. A
comparable bivariate probit model was developed by Boyes et al. (1989), where the two probit
equations concern the loan granting process and default by borrowers. To address the selection bias
issue in our setting (Heckman 1979), our paper pioneers the development of a trivariate probit model
5Other situations where help, in general, can be detrimental to the agent are presented by Gilbert and Silvera
(1996). Using diﬀerent experiments, the authors show that help can be used to undermine the beliefs of the observers,
who might attribute a successful performance to help rather than to the performer's abilities.
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to test for the robustness of our baseline bivariate probit model. The empirical literature moreover
argues that despite defaults, some loans may still be proﬁtable, if the default occurs suﬃciently
late. The bank might then be more concerned about the timing of a default than the default itself.
Roszbach (2004) addresses this issue by providing a survival time model. In line with this study,
we use an alternative measure of risk in a bivariate mixed model to check for the robustness of our
ﬁndings. The original feature of our paper lies in the developing formal empirical models, taking
into account endogeneity issues, selection bias or the survival time of the loans, to study how an
MFI assigns diﬀerent borrowers to training programs.
Regarding the empirical eﬀect of training on default, we ﬁnd a mitigated impact on probability
of default, but a signiﬁcant positive impact on survival time. These contrasting results are in line
with previous empirical ﬁndings in both developing and developed countries. Karlan and Valdivia
(2011), for example, ﬁnd a signiﬁcant impact of training on client retention and business knowledge
improvement but little evidence of impact on proﬁt or revenue increase in FINCA-Peru. On the
other hand, McKernan (2002) ﬁnds that noncredit aspects of microﬁnance in developing countries
(group cohesion, joint liability and social development programs) have positive eﬀects on borrowers'
proﬁts. In developed countries, Evans (2011) underlines some positive outcomes for business train-
ing under the Women's Initiative for Self Employment in the US, whereas Edgcomb (2002) reports
mixed results on correlations between completed training and successful entrepreneurship outcomes
for ﬁve case studies in the US.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we present the theoretical model.
We ﬁrst present the discrete borrower type model, followed by the continuous type model. Data
used to corroborate theoretical results is presented in section 3. In section 4 we present the econo-
metric model which we used to estimate the empirical results outlined in section 5. We check for
robustness of our results in section 6. Section 7 concludes.
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2 Theoretical model
2.1 General framework
The agent, a borrower, has a project for which he needs ﬁnancing. He has no collateral and no
personal investment. He needs to borrow from the bank the total amount of the project, which
we normalize to 1. The project generates a return, ρ, in the case of success and 0 in the case of
failure. The principal, an MFI, demands a return of R = 1 + r in the case of success with R < ρ,
where r is the ﬁxed interest rate. A ﬁxed interest rate is consistent with data used in the empirical
part of the paper, in which the MFI ﬁx the same interest rate for all borrowers. The MFI receives
0 in the case of failure. The probability of success (denoted p(θ, e, h)) depends on borrower type
θ, borrower eﬀort e and level of business training from the MFI h.6 We assume the probability of
success to be increasing in these three terms. θ can also be interpreted as the intrinsic probability of
success, depending on borrowers' and projects' characteristics and excluding the eﬀects of business
training and eﬀort (i.e. p(θ, 0, 0) = θ). Eﬀort is costly for the borrower and business training is
costly for the MFI. The respective costs are denoted by ϕ(h) and ψ(θ, e) (i.e. we allow the cost
of eﬀort to be type-dependent). The purpose of this paper is to analyze the relationship between
borrower type θ and level of allocated training h. We therefore abstract from the approval process, as
business training is only granted to accepted borrowers. Moreover, we assume that once a borrower
is accepted, the MFI maximizes proﬁt  or minimizes loss  on this borrower (although it can have a
diﬀerent objective function in the approval process). The objective function of the MFI is therefore
given by
UP = p(θ, e, h)R− ϕ(h)
6In the context of microﬁnance, business training may take diﬀerent forms. Generally, micro-borrowers follow
various courses in accounting or business management organized by the MFI or by its partners. From the approach
of the literature to double-sided moral hazard (Casamatta 2003; De Bettignies and Brander 2007), business training
may be interpreted as the eﬀort provided by the MFI.
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and the utility of the borrower is given by:
UA = p(θ, e, h)(ρ−R)− ψ(θ, e)
We follow the standard approach in banking modeling by assuming that the MFI is risk neutral.
To simplify the model, we additionally assume that the borrower is risk neutral.7 We analyze
two information structures. In the ﬁrst one, the information is perfect and symmetric: both the
borrower and the MFI observe borrower type θ. The MFI chooses h and the borrower chooses e
simultaneously.
Figure 1: Timing of contracting under symmetric information
Our aim is to determine whether reversed asymmetric information can lead the MFI not to provide
business training to the weakest types of borrowers, i.e. the riskiest borrowers. We will focus on
cases where, under perfect information, the MFI provides a level of business training decreasing
with type. This means that, in the absence of the looking-glass self eﬀect, the allocation of business
training might be considered as bad news for borrowers (as it would reﬂect a low probability of
success).
In the second conﬁguration, we assume reversed asymmetric information, that is, a situation where
the borrower does not know his type, while the MFI does. As pointed out in the introduction,
this informational setting is particularly relevant for the microcredit market, where inexperienced
7However, relaxing this second assumption and modeling a concave utility function UA(·) for the agent would not
change our result as long as UA(0) = 0.
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borrowers meet experienced MFIs. In this case, the level of business training chosen by the MFI (h)
also conveys information about the borrower's type and might inﬂuence the borrower's behavior. In
other words, by observing h, the borrower forms a belief about his type that leads him to some level
of eﬀort. When choosing h, the MFI internalizes this mechanism, that shapes its proﬁt through
borrower's eﬀort.
Figure 2: Timing of contracting under asymmetric information
We show that, unlike the symmetric information case, there can be a non-monotonic (concave)
relationship between business training and borrower type, in some Perfect Bayesian Equilibria
(PBE). The empirical section then seeks to conﬁrm this peculiar feature of business training.
To build our theoretical argument, we present a discrete and a continuous model. Both models have
advantages and drawbacks. The discrete model wins out on simplicity and can be used to illustrate
the main mechanisms at work. It additionally enables us to compare the payoﬀs to the MFI under
symmetric and reversed asymmetric information and to provide conditions under which the MFI is
better-oﬀ when it has superior information. The continuous model has the disadvantage of being
more complex; however, its advantage lies in being a better match for our empirical exercise, where
borrower type and business training provision are modeled as continuous variables.
2.2 The main mechanisms: A discrete illustration
We ﬁrst give the basic intuitions of our model through a simple discrete model (e ∈ {0, 1}, h ∈
{0, 1}) with three types of borrowers, that we will call weak-, medium- and strong-type borrowers:
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θ ∈ {θW , θM , θS}. Let ψ(θ, 0) = 0 ∀θ, ψ(θ, 1) = ψ ∀θ, ϕ(0) = 0 and ϕ(1) = ϕ. Borrowers' types are
deﬁned by the return on eﬀort and business training. We make the following assumptions:
A1: The return on eﬀort is increasing with type: [p(θ, 1, h)− p(θ, 0, h)] is increasing with θ, ∀h.
A2: The return on business training is decreasing with type: [p(θ, e, 1)− p(θ, e, 0)] is decreasing
with θ, ∀e.
A3: The weak-type borrowers do not have the incentive to provide eﬀort (whatever the level of
business training):
p(θW , 1, h)− p(θW , 0, h) < ψ
ρ−R < p(θM , 1, h)− p(θM , 0, h) ∀h
A4: The MFI is not interested in training the strong-type borrowers:
p(θM , e, 1)− p(θM , e, 0) > ϕ
R
> p(θS , e, 1)− p(θS , e, 0) ∀e
Our second assumption corresponds to Assumption 3 in Benabou and Tirole (2003a), while the
third and fourth assumptions are made to render our problem non trivial.
Remark 1. This setting leads to a situation where, under symmetric information, the MFI provides
business training to the two weakest types: θW and θM , and does not provide business training to
the strongest type: θS. Borrowers of types θM and θS provide eﬀort but the weak type θW does not.
.
Under reversed asymmetric information, the borrower is not aware of his type. Only the MFI ob-
serves it. The MFI's action (assignment to business training or not) may therefore convey informa-
tion to the borrower, who will form beliefs about his type after having observed the MFI's decision
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on business training.
Our aim is to show that there exists a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in which assignment to busi-
ness training is a non-monotonic function of borrower type, that is, in which the MFI only trains
borrowers of type θM . In this case, a borrower observing that he is not being trained infers that
he is either of weak (θW ) or strong (θS) type. Let us note α the probability that the borrower is
θS when he receives no business training from the MFI ((1 − α) is the probability of being θW ).
In other words, α represents the borrower's belief that he is strong-type when he observes that the
MFI chooses not to train him. Moreover, in the equilibrium considered, when the borrower observes
that the MFI has decided to train him he is certain that he is type θM . This leads to the following
proposition:
Proposition 1. Under reversed asymmetric information, there exists a PBE where the MFI only
helps θM -type borrowers and all borrowers exert eﬀort, if and only if:
(1− α) [p(θW , 1, 0)− p(θW , 0, 0)] + α [p(θS , 1, 0)− p(θS , 0, 0)] ≥ ψ
ρ−R (1)
This PBE is preferred by the MFI if:
p(θW , 0, 1)− p(θW , 1, 0) < ϕ
R
(2)
.
Condition (1) ensures that a borrower observing he is not being helped optimally exerts eﬀort,
whereas condition (2) states that the MFI prefers a situation where weak-type borrowers exert ef-
fort without being helped to one of equilibrium with symmetric information (where the weak-type
borrower does not exert eﬀort but receives help).
The intuition behind this result is rather simple. In the highlighted PBE, the MFI uses its superior
11
information to induce the weak-type borrowers to exert eﬀort. It does so by pooling them with the
strong-type borrowers, those for whom eﬀort is the most proﬁtable. This is done at the expense of
not providing them with business training, which is worth it under condition (2).
2.3 The continuous model
Let us now turn to a richer model with a continuum of types, eﬀort and business training: θ ∈ [0, 1],
e ∈ [0, 1] and h ∈ [0, 1]. In this case, we assume  for the sake of simplicity  that the impact of
business training or eﬀort on probability of success is decreasing with borrower type:
p′′1j < 0 for j = 2, 3
For the explicit form that we consider in this section, we speciﬁcally assume
p (θ, e, h) = θ + (1− θ)1
2
(e+ h). (3)
This form is in line with our deﬁnition of θ corresponding to the intrinsic probability of success
and with the literature on venture capital (Casamatta 2003), according to which eﬀort and busi-
ness training are perfect substitutes in terms of their impact on probability of success. Consis-
tent with the discrete model above, optimal eﬀort will be increasing with borrower type, due to
a discouragement eﬀect: a borrower who realizes or is led to believe he has a low intrinsic
probability of success will be discouraged from exerting eﬀort. This eﬀect will be captured in
our model through a type-speciﬁc cost of eﬀort. More precisely, we need ψ(θ, e) to be such that
E (θ, h) = arg max
e
[p (θ, e, h) (ρ−R)− ψ (θ, e)] is increasing in θ. One very simple way to model
this property  which keeps the model tractable  is to assume a linear eﬀort with respect to bor-
rower type E (θ, h) = γθ. This is in line with the economic literature in which the principal has a
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vested interest in boosting the agent's self-esteem in order to increase his motivation (Benabou and
Tirole 2002; Ishida 2006). Taking probability of success as deﬁned in (3), this optimal eﬀort can be
obtained, for instance, by assuming ψ(θ, e) = ρ−R4γ
1−θ
θ e
2.
Regarding the cost of business training incurred by the MFI, a quadratic form ϕ(h) = ch
2
2 (where
c is a positive constant) will be enough to ensure that the optimal level of business training is
decreasing with type under symmetric information.
Indeed, under symmetric information, the program of the MFI is given by:8

h∗ (θ) = arg max
h∈[0,1]
(
θ + 12 (1− θ) (e+ h)
)
R− 12ch2
s.t. e = γθ
Under this setting the following remark holds:
Remark 2. Under symmetric information, the optimal level of business training provided by the
MFI is decreasing with borrower type:
h∗ (θ) =
R
2c
(1− θ)
.
In other words, the MFI provides business training to those who need it most. The optimal level of
business training is a decreasing aﬃne function of borrower type.
Let us now turn to the case of reversed asymmetric information. Importantly, our aim is to show
that (in a situation where the level of business training is decreasing with type under symmetric
information) superior information may lead the MFI to train the weakest-type borrowers less. In
the case of a continuum of types, this would correspond to a non-monotonic (concave) relationship
8Note that we do not model the approval process. Therefore, we do not make any assumption on the MFI's position
regarding proﬁts. Consequently, our model is applicable both to non-proﬁt NGOs and to for-proﬁt commercial
organizations.
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between business training and type, i.e. an exotic pooling Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in which
several non-adjacent values of θ are associated with the same level of business training. Let us show
that such an equilibrium is possible.
Consider that business training is a concave non monotonic function of type h∗(θ) such that a level
of business training h is associated with two possible types θ(h) and θ(h) (except at its maximum).
A borrower observing a given level of business training infers some information about his type. The
inferred borrower type writes:
tθ(h) =
θ(h)fθ (θ(h)) + θ(h)fθ
(
θ(h)
)
fθ (θ(h)) + fθ
(
θ(h)
)
where fθ (x) represents the belief of a type θ borrower on the distribution of types. This will consist
in a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium if the optimal business training strategy when the borrower's
inferred type is tθ(·) is precisely h∗(θ), that is if h∗ is the solution of:

h∗ (θ) = arg max
h∈[0,1]
(
θ + 12 (1− θ) (e+ h)
)
R− 12ch2
s.t. e = γtθ(h)
The borrower updates his beliefs after having observed the level of business training chosen by
the MFI. This occurs due to the looking-glass self eﬀect. The MFI is aware of the borrower's
updating process. This mechanism is reﬂected in the constraint on borrower's eﬀort in the MFI's
maximization program. The borrower's eﬀort depends on the updated type rather than on the true
type, which is not observed by the borrower.
Proposition 2. There exists a PBE in which business training is a non-monotonic concave function
of type. It notably requires that borrowers' beliefs are decreasing with type: a high level of business
training is bad news for strong-type borrowers but a good news for weak-type borrowers.
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.To prove that this equilibrium exists, we analyze a particular concave business training function,
symmetric with respect to 12 : h
∗ = σθ(1−θ). In this case, the MFI oﬀers the same level of business
training h to borrowers of type:
θ(h) =
1
2
−
√
1
4
− h
σ
and θ(h) =
1
2
+
√
1
4
− h
σ
and (type-dependent) distributions of beliefs of the form:
fθ(x) = 1− σ
γ
(θ − 1)
(
x− 1
2
)
will lead to a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. Indeed, the inferred borrower type writes:
tθ(h) =
1− 2 (θ − 1)
(
1
4
σ
γ − hγ
)
2
such that the optimal level of business training which is a solution of

max
h∈[0,1]
(
θ + 12 (1− θ) (e+ h)
)
R− 12ch2
s.t. e = γtθ(h)
writes h(θ) = R2cθ (1− θ), which corresponds to the business training function h∗(θ) with σ = R2c .
In this equilibrium, the beliefs of borrowers correspond to distorted uniform distributions: distorted
upward for types θ < 1/2 and distorted downward for types θ > 1/2. Thus, for strong-type bor-
rowers business training is bad news, whereas it is good news for weak-type borrowers: for a given
level of business training, weak-type (resp. strong-type) borrowers put more weight on the higher
(resp. lower) corresponding type. This allows the MFI to increase the level of eﬀort provided by
15
weaker-type borrowers, by pooling them with stronger-type borrowers.
The above is intended to show that there exist Perfect Bayesian Equilibria in which business training
is a non-monotonic function of borrower type. There may be many other PBEs in the considered
setting, and a lot of other settings in which the highlighted PBE exists. We do not address multi-
plicity here. Rather, in the remainder of the paper, we present an empirical strategy that illustrates
the relevance of the featured equilibrium.
We emphasized in this theoretical section that, because of superior information, a microﬁnance
institution might not want to train (or might want to train less) the weakest-type borrowers. This
is because the MFI knows that its business training decision conveys information about the bor-
rower type. By pooling the weakest-type borrowers with strongest-type borrowers, the MFI uses
the looking-glass self eﬀect to induce them to exert more eﬀort.
In the following section we provide the institutional context of the MFI providing data for our
study, which we present in section 4. In section 5 we describe the econometric model aimed at
analyzing the relationship between assignment to business training and borrower type (measured
by their risk or ex-ante intrinsic probability of default). The econometric exercise will allow us to
analyze whether the MFI internalizes the fact that its business training decision impacts borrowers'
behavior through the looking-glass self eﬀect.
3 Institutional context of the MFI
CREASOL, the MFI providing data for our study, was created in 2006 in the South of France as
a non-proﬁt NGO, at the initiative of a commercial bank under its corporate social responsibility
scheme. This MFI generally targets individuals who have diﬃculty accessing ﬁnancial services from
mainstream banks, mainly residing in the Provence-Alpes-Côte-d'Azur region. In line with its social
mission statement, most of the MFI's clients are (long-term) unemployed, have low education and
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income levels and are starting a business for the ﬁrst time in their lives. Most of them are seeking
to become self-employed to escape unemployment and/or poverty. The MFI does not require any
collateral or guarantees from its clients, which means the total pool of applicants of this MFI is
considered too risky by most commercial banks.
In addition to microcredit services, this MFI is highly active in business training provision. Infor-
mation is available on all the applicants who were granted a microcredit between May 2008 and
May 2011,9 as well as on business training provision when loans were granted. To our knowledge,
the MFI's borrowers where not given any training other than that mentioned in the MFI's data set.
The MFI's clients include almost equal numbers of individuals receiving and not receiving training
(55% and 45% respectively). We have no evidence that the MFI choices to train primarily riskiest
clients. Unfortunately, we do not have data on business development (ex. proﬁts, sales, etc.), which
is only available in forecast form during the application stage, via a business plan presented by the
applicant. Hence, we cannot investigate the link between business training provision and business
development. Nevertheless, our data set contains information on borrowers' ex-post repayment be-
havior to the MFI. We observe the number and dates of unpaid installments, enabling us to test
for the presence of a non-linear relationship between business training provision and the borrower
type (i.e. likelihood of success) illustrated in the theoretical model.
Each individual can apply only once for a microcredit. This MFI aims at ﬁnancial inclusion of all
borrowers after granting the ﬁrst microcredit.10 The timing of the relationship between the MFI
and the borrower is the following. First the borrower applies for a loan. Then, the MFI decides
whether to accept or reject the borrower's application. The decision process involves several stages.
First, the loan oﬃcer presents the project during a credit committee meeting. Second, the credit
committee takes the decision to grant the loan or not. Third, the MFI decides whether or not
9Our sample covers the universe of applicants.
10As a consequence, the MFI does not provide dynamic incentives through progressive lending.
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to provide training to the selected applicants. Training is mandatory for the selected borrowers,
who cannot refuse to participate. We then observe for each client his/her microcredit repayment
behavior, i.e. the number and dates of unpaid installments.
4 Data
Using CREASOL data, we model three diﬀerent (consecutive) processes:
1. Granting of loan
2. Assignment to business training
3. Defaulting on three or more installments.
Table 1 gives the descriptive statistics for our data along with the t-tests to compare diﬀerent groups
means. Information on 782 applicants for a business loan was collected between May 2008 and May
2011.11 The vast majority of these loans was for a business start-up or buy-out, rather than for
business development. The average amount of the loans approved was e8, 900, the average interest
rate was 4.2%12 and the mean maturity was 52 months.
11We do not study consumer loans, in contrast to Roszbach (2004).
12The interest rate was ﬁxed at 4% per year at the beginning of the period and reached 4.5% at the end of the
period of analysis. The interest rate is ﬁxed and hence does not depend on borrower characteristics.
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47% of the applicants were granted a microcredit between May 2008 and May 2011. Data on re-
jected applicants is used to correct for selection bias in a robustness check. Our data set is unusual
in providing information on rejected applicants.
Table 1 shows that the proportion of long-term unemployed applicants (more than 12 months) is
signiﬁcantly greater among rejected projects. There is also a signiﬁcantly greater proportion of ap-
plicants with low personal investment (lower than 5%),13 projects in the food and accommodation
sector, projects having a high ratio of gross margin to sales. On average, accepted applicants come
from households with higher incomes.
55% of the accepted borrowers were assigned to a business training program.14 The individual
characteristics of borrowers assigned and not assigned to training do not appear to diﬀer much.
Nevertheless, a few diﬀerences deserve mention. The proportion of long-term unemployed individ-
uals is greater for borrowers assigned to business training. Moreover, they have higher household
incomes and their businesses have higher asset levels. Individuals assigned to business training
are more likely to have made other applications and to have been granted honor loans.15 This
diﬀerentiation is consistent with a microcredit setup where NGOs providing training programs also
provide honor loans: the variable Other applications often includes ongoing applications for an
honor loan. Hence, there is a direct link between the two variables and the likelihood of being
assigned to business training. These additional ﬁnancing sources appear to be important factors
in the MFI's decision to assign a borrower to a training program. Interestingly, applicants sent
by a mainstream bank are less likely to be assigned to a training program. This is in line with
13Low personal investment is a dummy taking value 1 if the applicant's personal ﬁnancial contribution to the
project is lower than 5% of the project size. We use this cut-oﬀ because it is the lowest available in our data after
No personal investment, and very few applicants provided no personal investment.
14Assignment to a training program can be interpreted as treatment and borrowers can be divided into a treated
and control group respectively. From this perspective, our paper ﬁts into the literature studying treatment eﬀects.
Nevertheless, treatment is obviously not randomly assigned in our case.
15An honor loan is an interest-free loan subsidized by the French government for individuals willing to start a
business in order to become self-employed. The government delegates the disbursement of these loans to NGOs,
which may also provide training programs.
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our intuition. Borrowers sent by a mainstream bank either have a co-ﬁnancing loan from the bank
(these are potentially strong-type clients) or have been rejected (these are potentially weak-type
clients). Our model predicts that both strong-type and weak-type clients are the least likely to be
trained.
To build a scoring model, we deﬁne as defaulting borrowers with 3 or more unpaid installments
in their credit history within the MFI. In other words, we use data on ex-post defaults by the
MFI's clients. 22% of all the accepted borrowers had 3 or more delayed payments in their credit
history. These loans will be termed as defaulting in the remainder of the paper.16 This deﬁnition
mirrors the MFI's actual policy: it generally writes oﬀ all loans involving three or more consecutive
delayed payments. 19% of the clients receiving business training are defaulting clients, against 25%
for clients not receiving business training. However, this diﬀerence is not signiﬁcant according to
the t-test. Almost half the defaulting loans were assigned to a training program, whereas 57% of
performing loans were assigned to a training program, but this diﬀerence is not signiﬁcant either.
As Table 1 illustrates, there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences between defaulting and performing clients.
These diﬀerences are usually (with some exceptions) of opposite sign to those for the approval de-
cision. This outcome is an indicator of the quality of the MFI's loan granting process. Defaulting
clients are more likely to be male, single, and long-term unemployed, with lower education, income
levels, personal investment and assets. All these variables will be taken into account for in the
design of the risk measure presented in the next section.
Descriptive statistics on the intrinsic borrower risk, modeled by a simple probit equation, are given
in Table 2. We note that the average predicted intrinsic risk for the entire pool of applicants is
0.24. Naturally, it decreases for accepted applicants to 0.22. These relatively high levels of risk
are handled by the MFI partly with the support of the government through (indirect) subsidies
16Note that the delayed payments need not be consecutive or remain unpaid. However, most delayed payments in
the database were consecutive.
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(Bourlès and Cozarenco 2014).
Table 2: Descriptive statistics on predicted intrinsic risk of the applicants
Mean Min Max SD
Accepted applicants 0.22 0 0.69 0.17
Rejected applicants 0.26 0 0.82 0.19
Total pool of applicants 0.24 0 0.82 0.18
In the next sections we use this data to test for the presence of the looking-glass self mechanism
pointed out in our theoretical model.
5 Econometric model
This section examines the relationship between borrower type and likelihood of being assigned to
a training program by the MFI. The borrower's type in the theoretical model, i.e. the intrinsic
probability of a business succeeding, corresponds in practice to the score given by the MFI to each
applicant during the approval process. However, because we do not have any information on this
score, we use the information on the ex-post defaults of the borrowers which is available from the
MFI. The aim is to use ex-post information on credit history to estimate the ex-ante score given by
the MFI, assuming that the MFI's scoring strategy is based on its previous experience. To proxi
borrower type, we use a probit equation that estimates the likelihood of a borrower defaulting.17
Among the explanatory variables, we include individual, household and business characteristics. In
addition, we control for business cycles18, which obviously impact the likelihood of defaulting. An
unfavorable economic environment during the start-up phase can jeopardize a business's chances
of surviving. We therefore include quarterly rates of increase in business failures (as a measure of
economic health) and in new business start-ups (as a measure of competition) at the time the loan
17DeYoung et al. (2008) show that credit scoring mitigates the information asymmetries associated with geograph-
ically distant small business borrowers.
18Source: Fiben, Banque de France.
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is granted (and one and two quarters latter) for each micro-enterprise in our sample, according to
its sector of activity. Data for business cycles exclusively cover the French PACA Region, the region
where our MFI operates.
As in the theoretical model, in addition to the individual, household and business characteristics
that are the components of θ, ex-post default depends on business training provision (h) and on
borrower's eﬀort (e). We will attempt to isolate these three eﬀects (θ, h, e). To identify the eﬀect
of business training, we introduce into the default equation a dummy taking value one if a borrower
receives business training and zero otherwise. To isolate the eﬀect of eﬀort on the likelihood of
defaulting, we will introduce a form of heteroscedasticity depending on business training and on
borrower's education level into the default equation, using a bivariate probit model.
This approach allows us to estimate the variable Risk depending solely on individual, household,
and business characteristics to proxy the borrower type in the theoretical model. The variable Risk
therefore corresponds to 1 − θ in our theoretical model. However, the interpretation of the PBE
equilibrium outlined in the theoretical model is not altered by this inversion: the non-monotonic
concave relationship between business training and type θ corresponds by symmetry to a non-
monotonic concave relationship between Risk and business training. We will therefore test the
following hypotheses:
H1: The likelihood of receiving business training is increasing with risk for low-risk borrowers.
H2: The likelihood of receiving business training is decreasing with risk for high-risk borrowers.
To test this non-linear relationship between the likelihood of receiving business training and borrower
type, as suggested by the theoretical framework, we include the predicted Risk and Risk2 variables
in the business training equation. More precisely, we jointly model two processes, business training
decisions and the probability of defaulting under unobserved individual heterogeneity. We control for
unobserved individual heterogeneity, taking into account the soft information about borrower type
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(motivation, skills, personality, etc.), collected by the MFI during face-to-face meetings. The joint
modeling allows us to control for endogeneity of business training in the default equation. Isolating
the eﬀect of business training in the default equation, moreover, provides a better estimation of the
intrinsic probability of default, i.e. a better proxy for borrower type.
Furthermore, the heteroscedasticity of the model captures the idea that observing the same level
of business training can trigger diﬀerent inference mechanisms in two diﬀerent borrowers. In other
words, the inference process introduces noise into a borrower's behavior (or eﬀort), and thereby
engendering noise in his likelihood of defaulting, which implies higher and non-constant variance.
This can naturally be represented by a scedastic function attached to the unobservable variable, vi.
By introducing heteroscedasticity into the default equation, we isolate the impact of eﬀort on the
probability of defaulting.
Thus, controlling for endogeneity and introducing heteroscedasticity help disentangle three diﬀerent
eﬀects discussed in the theoretical model: the eﬀect of training, borrower's eﬀort and borrower type.
Our bivariate model writes as follows:
y∗1i = β1x
′
i + λ1Risk + λ2Risk
2 + 1i y1i =

1 if y∗1i > 0 Business training
0 if y∗1i ≤ 0 Otherwise
(4)
y∗2i = β2w
′
i + ηBi + α1y1i + 2i y2i =

1 if y∗2i > 0 Default
0 if y∗2i ≤ 0 Otherwise
(5)
where xi is a vector of variables speciﬁc to the business training decision, wi is a vector of vari-
ous controls composed of individual, household and business characteristics and Bi is a vector of
variables measuring the business cycle of the sector of activity of enterprise i. It includes rate of
increase in business failures and in new business start-ups in enterprise i's sector of activity, at the
time of approval and one and two quarters after approval.
The correlation between the business training decision and defaulting is modeled by imposing the
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following structure on the error terms:
1i = ρ1vi + 
0
1i
2i = ρ2ivi + 
0
2i
where the components 01i, 
0
2i are independent idiosyncratic parts of the error terms and each
is assumed to follow a normal distribution N (0, 1). The common latent factor vi in the com-
pound terms 1i and 2i could be considered as an individual unobserved heterogeneity factor.
We assume that vi ∼ N (0, 1) and that this factor is independent of the idiosyncratic terms.
ρ2i ≡ ρ2exp(α2y1i + δEducationi), meaning that business training indirectly impacts the prob-
ability of defaulting through α2 (inference eﬀect). We moreover assume that the inference process
depends on the borrower's education level (or skills), through the coeﬃcient δ, which also represents
the indirect eﬀect of education on the probability of defaulting.
The parameters ρ1 and ρ2 are free factor loadings which should be estimated. For identiﬁcation
reasons, we impose the constraint ρ2 = 1. Hence, borrower type is proxied by Risk = Φ(w
′
iβˆ2 + vi),
where Φ(·) is the normal cumulative distribution function and βˆ2 is estimated using equation (5).
Therefore Risk is the estimated intrinsic probability of the borrower defaulting.19
For model identiﬁcation, it is important to ensure that the variables in the xi vector are diﬀerent
from the variables in the wi vector. As described in the Data section, the three variables Honor
loan, Other applications and Sent by a mainstream bank are directly linked to the business
training process. Hence, we use these three variables exclusively in the business training equation.
We use business cycle indicators in the default equation to ensure full identiﬁcation of our model;
the rate of increase in business failures and in new businesses start-ups at the outset of the micro-
19By intrinsic probability of defaulting we mean the probability of defaulting cleaned of the eﬀect of business
training and borrower's eﬀort.
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enterprise (i.e. at the beginning of loan, and one and two quartes after the beginning of loan).
These cannot be used in the training equation, as they occur after assignment to training.
Like in the theoretical model, this model is estimated only for granted loans, as an individual can
only be assigned to a training program if he has actually been granted a microcredit. Hence, we do
not account for selection bias in the bivariate probit model, selection bias correction being left to
robustness exercise.
We maximize the log of the likelihood function which is the sum of individual contributions to
likelihood (see Appendix A). The starting values for the bivariate probit model, which can also be
consulted for benchmarking purposes, are given by the univariate estimation presented in Table 7,
in Appendix D.
6 Econometric results
The estimations for the bivariate heteroscedastic probit model are presented in Table 3.20
The non-linear relationship between the likelihood of receiving business training and borrower type
is shaped by the coeﬃcients of Risk and Risk2. The Risk loading is positive in all the speciﬁcations
and the loading of the quadratic term is always negative, suggesting that the MFI is more likely
not to provide business training to borrowers representing a very low or a very high risk; the
probability of receiving business training is ﬁrst increasing with risk and then, beyond a certain
threshold, decreasing with risk. This relationship is signiﬁcant at 1% level. We can compute, using
the estimators in column (1), the risk threshold beyond which the probability of receiving business
training begins to decrease with risk. To do so we use the derivative:
∂Pr(y1i = 1|xi, Risk, vi)
∂Risk
= (λˆ1 + 2λˆ2Risk)φ(·)
20In this paper we are interested in the signs of the loadings and not the sizes of marginal eﬀects. Hence all results
presented are estimated coeﬃcients rather than marginal eﬀects.
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where φ(·) is a normal density which is always positive. Hence the sign of the previous derivative is
given by λˆ1 + 2λˆ2Risk. It will be positive for Risk smaller than 0.35 and negative otherwise. We
estimated the Risk = Φ(w′iβˆ2 + vi) for each accepted client in our dataset. 77% have an estimated
risk lower than 0.35 and 23% have an estimated risk higher than this threshold. The estimated
probability of receiving business training as a function of the estimated risk of the borrowers is
presented in Figure 3.
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Figure 3: Bivariate Probit Model Estimations
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Table 3: Determinants of Business Training and Default Processes
Model Bivariate probit
(1) (2)
Dependent variable: Business training Default
Explanatory variables:
Risk 24.71*** (9.56)
Risk2 -35.61*** (13.34)
Other applications 3.52*** (1.3)
Honor loan 1.46*** (0.54)
Sent by a mainstream bank -1.76** (0.73)
ρˆ1 1.53** (0.63)
Business training (direct eﬀect) -0.33 (0.23)
Male 0.84*** (0.12)
Education (direct eﬀect) -0.11* (0.04)
Single 0.33*** (0.12)
Unemployed at least 12 months -0.06 (0.1)
Household income (kEUR) -0.5*** (0.11)
Household expenses (kEUR) 0.81*** (0.15)
Low personal investment 0.2* (0.11)
Assets -0.04*** (0.01)
Food and accommodation sector 0.96*** (0.14)
Gross margin/Sales -0.64** (0.26)
Rate of increase in failures beginning of loan 0.009 (0.006)
Rate of increase in failures beginning of loan +1Q 0.01* (0.005)
Rate of increase in failures beginning of loan +2Q 0.004 (0.007)
Rate of increase in new start-ups beginning of loan 0.015*** (0.004)
Rate of increase in new start-ups beginning of loan +1Q 0.005 (0.004)
Rate of increase in new start-ups beginning of loan +2Q -0.002 (0.005)
Business training (indirect eﬀect) 1.00** (0.47)
Education (indirect eﬀect) -0.68* (0.36)
Intercept -3.15*** (1.18) -0.27 (0.29)
-2 Log Likelihood 653
Observations 340
Standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05,*p<0.1
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The
concave curve is a second degree ﬁt curve for the predicted data. For the 23% of clients having a risk
level above the 0.35 threshold, the likelihood of being assigned to a training program is decreasing
with Risk, as the MFI is concerned about the negative impact business training might have on their
inferred type.
Regarding other control variables in the business training equation we observe a highly signiﬁcant
positive relationship between business training and other applications and honor loan. Being sent
by a mainstream bank, however, is negatively associated with the likelihood of receiving business
training. Individuals sent by a mainstream bank have either been rejected by the mainstream bank
(and are likely high risk) or have been granted a co-ﬁnancing credit by the mainstream bank (and
are low risk). In both of these situations, we expect such individuals to be the least likely to be
assigned to a training program, due to a potential undermining eﬀect on motivation (for high-risk
individuals) or to their good performance ruling out any need for business training (for low-risk
individuals). ρˆ1 is signiﬁcant at 5%, suggesting that endogeneity bias is indeed an issue and the
bivariate model is better able to deal with it than the univariate model.
Turning to the default equation, business training does not signiﬁcantly impact the likelihood of
defaulting. Male clients are signiﬁcantly more likely to default than female clients. Higher education
(measured by the number of qualiﬁcations achieved) signiﬁcantly decreases a client's riskiness. Sin-
gle individuals are more likely to default. Household income and expenses are respectively strong
negative and positive determinants of the likelihood of defaulting. Borrowers with low personal
investment seem to be riskier than businesses with greater assets. Businesses in the food and
accommodation sector are riskier than those in other sectors of activity. Finally, the gross margin-
to-sales ratio is associated with lower business risk.
Interestingly, rates of increase in business failures and start-ups are both positively correlated with
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risk. An increase in the rate of new business start-ups implies increasing competition in the sector,
which will negatively impact the performance of the MFI's clients. An increase in failure rates is
signiﬁcant and positive one quarter after the beginning of the loan, whereas an increase in start-up
rates is signiﬁcant and positive at the time loan is granted. Overall, the signs of the loadings are in
line with economic intuition.
Concerning heteroscedasticity, the indirect eﬀects of business training and education are signiﬁcant
at 5% and 10% levels respectively, with opposite signs. A higher level of business training increases
uncertainty about the risk of default. This would appear to be in line with the intuition that
business training mainly targets intermediary-risk individuals. Finally, a higher level of education
signiﬁcantly decreases the variance of the unobserved individual heterogeneity term, vi. In other
words, there is more certainty about the risk of default for borrowers with higher education.
In the next section, several robustness checks are applied to our main results on the looking-glass self
eﬀect. We perform two robustness checks that consist in controlling for selection bias and deﬁning
an alternative measure of risk.
7 Robustness checks
7.1 Correcting for selection bias
In this section we add to the previous bivariate models a third equation, namely the loan approval
decision, which allows us to correct for selection bias. Adding the approval process will also reveal
whether the MFI chooses its clients optimally in terms of their expected performance, or if it accepts
applicants regardless of their characteristics. This loan approval process is addressed in a reduced
form: we do not impose any constraint on the link between the two equations. Instead, we add a
third equation on loan approval, using the same explanatory variables wi as in default equation, as
suggested by Roszbach (2004):
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y∗0i = β0w
′
i + η0B0i + 0i y0i =

1 if y∗0i > 0 Granted
0 if y∗0i ≤ 0 Otherwise
(6)
We moreover introduce into the approval equation business cycle variables (B0i) that may impact the MFI's
decision to grant the loan or not. B0i corresponds to the rate of increase in business failures and new business
start-ups in the sector of enterprise i at the time of approval, and one quarter and two quarters before loan
approval. The business cycles operating before approval of the loan will ensure the identiﬁcation of the
trivariate model.21 In this model, we allow for correlation between both decisions (approval and business
training) and the risk equation by imposing a similar structure on the error terms having an equivalent error
composition and the same distributional assumptions:
0i = ρ0vi + 
0
0i
The results are presented in Table 4.
21In the default equation business cycles are introduced at the beginning of the loan (and one and two quarters
latter), whereas in the approval equation, business cycles are introduced at approval, which does not necessarily
coincide with the beginning of the loan. Hence, it is possible for there to be no overlap between the business cycle
variables in the approval and default equations.
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Table 4: Determinants of Approval, Business Training and Default Processes
Model Trivariate probit
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable: Approval Business training Default
Explanatory variables:
Risk 27.04*** (10.47)
Risk2 -46.13** (20.93)
Other applications 3.17*** (1.2)
Honor loan 1.44*** (0.48)
Sent by a mainstream bank -1.5*** (0.53)
ρˆ1 1.13** (0.46)
Business training (direct eﬀect) 0.82*** (0.22)
Male -0.16 (0.13) 0.51*** (0.13)
Education (direct eﬀect) -0.02 (0.05) -0.27*** (0.07)
Single -0.003 (0.14) 0.30** (0.14)
Unemployed at least 12 months -0.33** (0.13) 0.13 (0.12)
Household income (kEUR) 0.12* (0.07) -0.46*** (0.07)
Household expenses (kEUR) -0.24* (0.14) 1.17*** (0.13)
Low personal investment -0.31** (0.14) 0.27** (0.12)
Assets 0.003 (0.003) -0.02*** (0.01)
Food and accommodation sector -0.45** (0.19) 0.67*** (0.18)
Gross margin/Sales -0.57* (0.32) -0.28 (0.30)
ρˆ0 0.74*** (0.22)
Rate of increase in failure approval stage -2.93*** (0.79)
Rate of increase in failure approval stage -1Q -2.32*** (0.72)
Rate of increase in start-ups beginning of loan 0.03*** (0.01)
Business training (indirect eﬀect) -14.17 (530)
Education (indirect eﬀect) 0.32*** (0.09)
Intercept 0.77** (0.34) -3.67*** (1.42) -1.38*** (0.32)
-2 Log Likelihood 1518
Observations 662
Standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05,*p<0.1
Only signiﬁcant control variables for business cycles are presented.
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Controlling for selection bias does not alter our main results. We note that the loadings for Risk and Risk2
are larger in absolute value compared to the bivariate model. The Risk threshold at which the likelihood
of receiving business training is reversed is 0.29. 11% of accepted borrowers have an estimated risk higher
than 0.29.
As expected, the main coeﬃcients in the approval equation are of the opposite sign to that in the risk
equation. However, the estimates of some parameters change, the most striking diﬀerence being the direct
eﬀect of business training. Here, business training is found to increase the likelihood of defaulting, whereas
in the bivariate model this coeﬃcient was not signiﬁcant. Interestingly, in the scedastic function, the indirect
eﬀect of business training is no longer signiﬁcant and the indirect eﬀect of education becomes signiﬁcantly
positive, suggesting that default risk uncertainty increases for better educated individuals.
Concerning business cycles, we note that the rate of increase in failures negatively impacts the approval
process, whereas a higher rate of increase in start-ups at the beginning of the loan (i.e. greater competition)
positively impacts the likelihood of defaulting.
Finally, both ρˆ1 and ρˆ0 are signiﬁcant, suggesting that, there indeed is a correlation among the error terms
of the three processes that has to be taken into account.
7.2 An alternative measure of risk: the inverse of survival time
One potential problem of our data is that borrowers receive microcredits at diﬀerent times. Obviously,
long-standing clients are more likely to default than to newly-granted loans. To get round the problem of
censored data, we will use as a robustness check an alternative measure of risk consisting in the inverse
of expected survival time. We fully expect this richer information to provide a clearer picture of the true
default process. However, we cannot claim that this longitudinal approach will allow us to better replicate
the assessment of borrowers' type by the MFI. Put another way, we do not know whether the MFI is able
to use this more sophisticated measure of risk based on longitudinal assessment, or whether it ignores this
information and only bases its decision on a simpler probit scoring model. Table 5 presents descriptive
statistics on the survival time of each microcredit.
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Table 5: Descriptive statistics for survival time (in days)
Percentiles
Sub-sample Mean SD Min 5 10 25 50 75 90 95 Max
Ti, defaulting loans 340.1 237 0 61 92 184 274 457 668 822 1156
Ti, performing loans 469.5 327.8 31 92 123 214 365 638 1003 1095 1279
This extends the previous model by adding information on the survival time of a loan, Ti. In this model,
the risk equation covers the time that elapses before a default occurs rather than just the occurrence of a
default. We deﬁne ti as follows. For defaulted loans, ti is the number of days between the date the loan is
granted and the date default occurs. For non-defaulted loans, ti is the number of days between the date the
loan is granted and the date of data extraction. The survival time is then either perfectly observed when a
default occurs y2i = 1, i.e. Ti = ti, or is censored as the loan is still performing when y2i = 0, i.e. Ti > ti.
The bivariate mixed model will allow us to estimate the survival time for each loan. To do so, we assume
that survival time follows the Weibull distribution, the duration distribution most commonly used in applied
econometrics (Lancaster 1992).
Ti|vi, wi,Bi, y1i ∼Weibull(µi, σ) where µi ≡ exp(β2w′i + ηBi + α1y1i + ρ2ivi)
where ρ2i ≡ exp(α2y1i + δEducationi). The expected survival time is given by:
E(Ti|wi,Bi, y1i, vi) = µ−1i Γ(1 +
1
σ
) (7)
where Γ(.) is the complete Gamma function (for more details see Lancaster (1992), Appendix 1) and σ is
the Weibull scale parameter. Consequently, the likelihood of default is necessarily inversely related to the
expected survival time. We consider an alternative measure of this risk given by the inverse of E(Ti|wi, vi).
We therefore replace the probability of defaulting by this alternative measure of risk in the business training
decision process. Consistent with previous models, we obviously exclude both the current decision y1i and
the business cycle variables from the set of covariates.
Concerning the identiﬁcation strategy, the expected survival time of a loan will be identiﬁed using the
observed survival time, censored or not, of the granted loans. The identiﬁcation mechanism in this model,
like the baseline model, is not only obtained through the non-linear function of the linear combination of
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the determinants of risk but, above all, by the inclusion of business cycle indicators in the duration model.
We present the results of the estimation for this model in Table 6.
The non-monotonic relationship between y2 and Risk is robust to the introduction of this alternative risk
measure.22 The threshold where business training becomes decreasing with risk is 1.78. Estimating risk,
which is the inverse of survival time, for the MFI's clients, we ﬁnd that only 2% of the sample has an expected
risk higher than 1.78. Note however, that despite giving a better estimation of the real default process, the
mixed model does not necessarily provide a better proxy of the information available to the MFI in practice.
Crucially, in this mixed model the coeﬃcient for y2 becomes signiﬁcant in the inverse of the survival time
equation. This ﬁnding suggests that business training is indeed useful to increase a business's chances of
success. The non-signiﬁcance of this coeﬃcient in the bivariate probit equation might be due to reduced
variability in the risk variable, which is a dummy. Nevertheless, the positive signiﬁcant impact in the
trivariate model leaves the current debate on the eﬃciency of business training open.
The Weibull parameter is signiﬁcant and positive, suggesting that risk is increasing with time. The signs
of other controls are in line with previous ﬁndings, despite some diﬀerences in signiﬁcance: for example,
long-term unemployment becomes highly signiﬁcant.
22We multiply the Risk variable by 100 to scale down the estimated coeﬃcients and render them comparable to
other loadings.
35
Table 6: Determinants of Business Training and Inverse of Survival Time
Model Bivariate Mixed
(1) (2)
Dependent variable: Business training Inverse of Survival Time
Explanatory variables:
Risk 1.71*** (0.65)
Risk2 -0.48** (0.22)
Other applications 1.15*** (0.19)
Honor loan 0.56*** (0.18)
Sent by a mainstream bank -0.53*** (0.2)
ρˆ1 0.23 (0.17)
Business training (direct eﬀect) -0.86*** (0.23)
Male 0.67*** (0.22)
Education (direct eﬀect) -0.49*** (0.1)
Single -0.16 (0.14)
Unemployed at least 12 months 0.53*** (0.14)
Household income (kEUR) -0.41*** (0.09)
Household expenses (kEUR) 0.8*** (0.18)
Low personal investment 0.48*** (0.14)
Assets -0.01 (0.01)
Food and accommodation sector 0.06 (0.21)
Gross margin/Sales -1.16*** (0.31)
Business training (indirect eﬀect) -0.22 (0.14)
Education (indirect eﬀect) 0.13*** (0.05)
Rate of increase in failures beginning of loan 0.006 (0.004)
Rate of increase in failures beginning of loan +1Q 0.01** (0.004)
Rate of increase in failures beginning of loan +2Q 0.01*** (0.003)
Rate of increase in start-ups beginning of loan 0.005* (0.003)
Rate of increase in start-ups beginning of loan +1Q 0.001 (0.003)
Rate of increase in start-ups beginning of loan +2Q -0.01*** (0.003)
Weibull parameter 3.02*** (0.55)
Intercept -0.96*** (0.19) -5.57*** (0.36)
-2 Log Likelihood 1612
Observations 340
Standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05,*p<0.1
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8 Conclusion
In this paper we analyze how superior information can impact MFIs' decisions to assign borrowers to training
programs. In the theoretical model we show that, in situations where the relationship between business
training and borrower type is decreasing under symmetric information, a non-monotonic relationship between
business training and borrower type may arise under reversed asymmetric information, where the MFI has
superior information about the borrower's type.
We reveal the existence of this equilibrium using original data from a French MFI which, in addition to
loan-granting, assigned some of its clients to training programs. Using a bivariate probit model to control
for endogeneity between business training and the riskiness of the borrower, we show that a non-monotonic
relationship between assignment to training and the risk of default is indeed observed in practice. The MFI
seems to take into account the looking-glass self eﬀect, that is the fact that its choices impact borrowers'
beliefs about their type on the microcredit market.
Our paper provides interesting insights into how MFIs' decisions might undermine borrowers' motivation to
exert eﬀort. However, further research would contribute evidence to support the conditions on borrowers'
beliefs in this mechanism. It would be useful to conﬁrm the assumptions of the theoretical model by testing
the hypothesis that business training has a greater impact on high-risk borrowers than on low-risk borrowers.
9 Appendix
A. Bivariate Probit Model: Likelihood Function
The individual contribution to the likelihood function given the common factor vi can be written as follows:
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Li(θ|y1i, y2i, xi, wi, vi) = Φ
(
x
′
iβ1 + λ1Φ(w
′
iβ2 + vi) + λ2
[
Φ(w
′
iβ2 + vi)
]2
+ ρ1vi
)y1i
︸ ︷︷ ︸
P (y1i=1|vi,...)
·
[
1− Φ
(
x
′
iβ1 + λ1Φ(w
′
iβ2 + vi) + λ2
[
Φ(w
′
iβ2 + vi)
]2
+ ρ1vi
)](1−y1i)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
P (y1i=0|vi,...)
·
[
Φ(w
′
iβ2 + ηBi + α1y1i + vi)
]y2i
︸ ︷︷ ︸
P (y2i=1|vi,y1i,...)
·
[
1− Φ(w′iβ2 + ηBi + α1y1i + vi)
](1−y2i)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
P (y2i=0|vi,y1i,...)
Hence, in the ﬁrst model with two simultaneous probit equations we have to integrate Li with respect to the
density function of vi, by using the adaptive Gaussian quadrature integral approximation, we maximize the
log of the likelihood function.
l(θ|y1i, y2i, xi, wi)
=
n∑
i=1
ln
(∫
Li(θ|y1i, y2i, xi, wi, vi)φ(vi)dvi
)
B. Trivariate Probit Model: Likelihood Function
The individual contribution to the likelihood function given the common factor vi can be written as follows:
Li(θ|y0i, y1i, y2i, wi, xi, vi) = Φ
(
w
′
iβ0 + η0B0i + ρ0vi
)y0i
︸ ︷︷ ︸
P (y0i=1|vi,...)
·
[
1− Φ
(
w
′
iβ0 + η0B0i + ρ0vi
)](1−y0i)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
P (y0i=0|vi,...)
·
Φ
(
x
′
iβ1 + λ1Φ(w
′
iβ2 + vi) + λ2
[
Φ(w
′
iβ2 + vi)
]2
+ ρ1vi
)y0iy1i
︸ ︷︷ ︸
P (y1i=1|vi,y0i=1,...)
·
[
1− Φ
(
x
′
iβ1 + λ1Φ(w
′
iβ2 + vi) + λ2
[
Φ(w
′
iβ2 + vi)
]2
+ ρ1vi
)]y0i(1−y1i)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
P (y1i=0|vi,y0i=1,...)
·
[
Φ(w
′
iβ2 + ηBi + α1y1i + vi)
]y0iy2i
︸ ︷︷ ︸
P (y2i=1|vi,y0i=1,y1i,...)
·
[
1− Φ(w′iβ2 + ηBi + α1y1i + vi)
]y0i(1−y2i)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
P (y2i=0|vi,y0i=1,y1i,...)
Hence, in the model with three simultaneous probit equations we have to integrate Li with respect to the
density function of vi, by using the adaptive Gaussian quadrature integral approximation, we maximize the
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log of the likelihood function.
l(θ|y0i, y1i, y2i, wi, xi)
=
n∑
i=1
ln
(∫
Li(θ|y0i, y1i, y2i, wi, xi, vi)φ(vi)dvi
)
C. Bivariate Mixed Model: Likelihood Function
The individual contribution to the likelihood function conditional on vi using loan survival time can be
written as follows:
Li(θ|y1i, y2i, ti, xi, wi, vi)
= Φ
(
x
′
iβ1 + λ1E(Ti)
−1 + λ2E(Ti)−2 + ρ1vi
)y1i
︸ ︷︷ ︸
P (y1i=1|vi,...)[
1− Φ
(
x
′
iβ1 + λ1E(Ti)
−1 + λ2E(Ti)−2 + ρ1vi
)](1−y1i)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
P (y1i=0|vi,...)[
σµσi t
σ−1
i exp {− (µiti)σ}
]y2i︸ ︷︷ ︸
f(ti|vi,y1i,...)
[exp {− (µiti)σ}](1−y2i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
P (Ti>ti|vi,y1i,...)
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D. Univariate Model Results
Table 7: Determinants of Business Training and Default Processes
Model Univariate probit
(1) (2)
Dependent variable: Business training Default
Explanatory variables:
Risk 1.07 (1.4)
Risk2 -1.20 (2.4)
Other applications 1.07*** (0.17)
Honor loan 0.51*** (0.16)
Sent by a mainstream bank -0.55*** (0.19)
ρˆ1
Business training (direct eﬀect) -0.15 (0.18)
Male 0.62*** (0.2)
Education (direct eﬀect) -0.18** (0.07)
Single 0.06 (0.19)
Unemployed at least 12 months 0.33* (0.19)
Household income (kEUR) -0.29** (0.12)
Household expenses (kEUR) 0.66*** (0.23)
Low personal investment 0.35* (0.19)
Assets -0.02*** (0.01)
Food and accommodation sector 0.23 (0.31)
Gross margin/Sales -1.03** (0.45)
Rate of increase in failures beginning of loan 0.009 (0.006)
Rate of increase in failures beginning of loan +1 0.008* (0.004)
Rate of increase in failures beginning of loan +2 0.007 (0.005)
Rate of increase in start-ups beginning of loan 0.012*** (0.004)
Rate of increase in start-ups beginning of loan +1 0.006 (0.004)
Rate of increase in start-ups beginning of loan +2 -0.001 (0.004)
Intercept -0.75*** (0.22) -0.03 (0.48)
-2 Log Likelihood 371 293
Observations 342 340
Standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05,*p<0.1
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